Amendment of Section 2 of Divorce Act 1869

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA

Amendment of Section 2 of Divorce Act 1869

Enabling Non-domiciled Estranged Christian Wives to seek Divorce
Report No. 224
June 2009

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA
(REPORT NO. 224)
Amendment of Section 2 of Divorce Act 1869
Enabling Non-domiciled Estranged Christian Wives to seek Divorce
Submitted to the Union Minister of Law and Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India by Dr. Justice AR. Lakshmanan, Chairman, Law Commission of India, on the 25th day of June,2009.

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The 18th Law Commission was constituted for a period of three years from 1st September, 2006 by Order No. A.45012/1/2006-Admn.III (LA) dated the 16th October, 2006, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, New Delhi.
The Law Commission consists of the Chairman, the Member-Secretary, one full-time Member and seven part-time Members.

Chairman
Hon’ble Dr. Justice AR. Lakshmanan
Member-Secretary
Dr. Brahm A. Agrawal
Full-time Member
Prof. Dr. Tahir Mahmood
Part-time Members
Dr. (Mrs.) Devinder Kumari Raheja
Dr. K. N. Chandrasekharan Pillai
Prof. (Mrs.) Lakshmi Jambholkar
Smt. Kirti Singh
Shri Justice I. Venkatanarayana
Shri O.P. Sharma
Dr. (Mrs.) Shyamlha Pappu

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Member-Secretary
Dr. Brahm A. Agrawal
Research Staff
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Shri A. K. Upadhyay : Deputy Law Officer
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Dr. R. S. Shrinet : Superintendent (Legal) Administrative Staff
Shri Sushil Kumar : Joint Secretary& Law Officer
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Smt. Rajni Sharma : Assistant Library & Information Officer


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Dr. Justice AR. Lakshmanan
(Former Judge, Supreme Court of India),
Chairman, Law Commission of India
ILI Building (IInd
Floor)
Bhagwandas Road,
New Delhi – 110 001
Tel. 91-11-23384475
Fax. 91-11 –
23383564
D.O. No. 6(3)/158/2009-LC (LS) 25 June, 2009

Dear Dr Veerappa Moily ji,
Subject: Amendment of Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 : Enabling Non-domiciled Estranged Christian Wives to seek Divorce


I am forwarding herewith the 224th Report of the Law Commission of India on the above subject. The Law Commission was requested by the Government of India in the Ministry of Law and Justice (Department of Legal Affairs) to examine the suggestion of the Madras High Court contained in its Order dated 17.11.2008 in Indira Rachel v. Union of India [W.P. No. 12816 of 1995] that suitable amendment of Section 2 of the Divorce Act 1869 be considered, vide their DO letter No. A-60011/25/2009- Admn.III(LA) dated 30.03.2009.
The Divorce Act 1869 can also be invoked to dissolve Christian
marriages performed outside India. However, this Act does not
confer jurisdiction on the Indian courts to dissolve Christian
marriages of non-domiciled parties. Further, in determining the
domicile of the parties in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage it is
the domicile of the husband alone which is to be considered
inasmuch as a wife takes the domicile of her husband upon her
marriage.

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It was for the Law Commission’s consideration as to whether
Section 2 of the Divorce Act needed suitable amendment to enable
the Indian courts to entertain a petition for dissolution of a Christian
marriage where husband has changed his Indian domicile and his
wife is resident in India at the time of presenting the petition.
The Law Commission has come to the conclusion that Section
2 of the Divorce Act 1869 insofar as it concerns the jurisdictional rule
in regard to petitions for divorce is not only not in tune with the
present times but is also harsh upon Christian women in India.
The Law Commission has, therefore, recommended that
Section 2 of the Divorce Act 1869 should be suitably amended in
order that the Indian courts shall be entitled to entertain a petition for
dissolution of a Christian marriage where either of the parties to the
marriage is domiciled in India at the time when the petition is
presented. However, this suggestion would also need simultaneous
change in the rule of Private International Law as to a wife’s domicile,
that is, abolition of wife’s dependent domicile, as done in England
through the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. In the
alternative, following the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 2003, the
said provision may be amended to provide that a petition for divorce
may be filed by a Christian wife at the place where she is residing on
the date of the presentation of the petition.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
(Dr AR. Lakshmanan)
Dr M. Veerappa Moily,
Union Minister of Law and Justice,
Government of India,
Shastri Bhawan,
New Delhi – 110 001.

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Amendment of Section 2 of Divorce Act 1869
Enabling Non-domiciled Estranged Christian
Wives to seek Divorce

Contents
Page No.
I. INTRODUCTION 9-11
II. DOMICILE VS. RESIDENCE 12-16
III. 15TH REPORT OF THE 17
LAW COMMISSION (1960)
V. CONCLUSION AND 18
RECOMMENDATION

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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Law Commission was requested by the Government of
India in the Ministry of Law and Justice (Department of Legal Affairs)
to examine the suggestion of the Madras High Court contained in its
Order dated 17.11.2008 in Indira Rachel v. Union of India [W.P. No.
12816 of 1995] that suitable amendment of Section 2 of the Divorce
Act 1869 be considered, vide their DO letter No. A-60011/25/2009-
Admn.III(LA) dated 30.03.2009.
1.2 Section 2 of the Divorce Act 1869, which provides for the extent
of the Act as well as the power to grant relief generally, reads:
“This Act extends to the whole of India except the State of
Jammu and Kashmir.
Nothing hereinafter contained shall authorise any court to
grant any relief under this Act except where the petitioner or
respondent professes the Christian religion,
and to make decrees of dissolution of marriage except
where the parties to the marriage are domiciled in India at the
time when the petition is presented,
or to make decrees of nullity of marriage except where
the marriage has been solemnized in India and the petitioner is
resident in India at the time of presenting the petition,

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or to grant any relief under this Act, other than a decree
of dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage, except where
the petitioner resides in India at the time of presenting the
petition.”
1.3 The Divorce Act 1869 can also be invoked to dissolve Christian
marriages performed outside India.1 However, this Act does not
confer jurisdiction on the Indian courts to dissolve Christian
marriages of non-domiciled parties.2 Further, in determining the
domicile of the parties in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage it is
the domicile of the husband alone which is to be considered
inasmuch as a wife takes the domicile of her husband upon her
marriage.3
1.4 Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the aforesaid Order of the Madras High
Court read:
“4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submitted that if Section 2 of the Act is given a literal
interpretation, it would mean that the courts in India will be
unable to entertain the proceedings for dissolution of the
marriage except where the parties to the marriage are
domiciled in India at the time when the petition is presented.
He apprehends that if a literal meaning is given, it would mean
that unless both the parties are domiciled in India at the time of
presentation of the petition, the Courts shall be unable to
entertain such matter, which would result in grave injustice to
either of the parties and it would defeat the very purpose of the
Act. To amplify the said submission, the learned counsel for
the petitioner pointed out that if in a given case, either of the
1 A. G. Gupte, Law of Marriage and Divorce, 1st edition, Premier Publishing Company, Allahabad (2007),
p. 1049
2 H. K. Saharay, Laws of Marriage and Divorce, 5th edition, Eastern Law House, Kolkata (2007), p. 368
3 R. E. Attaullah v. J. Attaullah, AIR 1953 Cal 530

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spouse migrates to another country on permanent basis and
the question arises at that stage, such party can be considered
as ‘domicile’ of a foreign country and therefore the party left
behind in India would be left with no legal remedy. The
petitioner therefore prays that in order to avoid such difficulties,
section 2 of the Act has to be declared ultra vires.
5. Though the provisions of the Act can be interpreted in
a literal manner, to conclude that both parties must be
domiciled in India at the time of presentation of the petition, in
our considered view, to effectuate the present intention of the
Act, which had come into force in the year 1869, possibly,
when such contingencies were not in contemplation, a
purposive interpretation can be given to make it reasonable
and more consistent with the principles enshrined in the
Constitution. If the aforesaid provision is construed to mean
that a petition would be maintainable if at the time of
presentation of the petition either party is domiciled in India, the
difficulty projected by the petitioner would not arise and on the
other hand, object can be achieved. Therefore, according to us,
such provision should be interpreted to mean that the Courts in
India shall be entitled to entertain petition for dissolution of
marriage where either of the parties to the marriage is
domiciled in India at the time when the petition is presented
and such provision need not be construed as if both the parties
must be domiciled in India at the time of presentation of the
petition. In our considered view, such an interpretation would
bring it in consonance with the philosophy of the Constitution.
Moreover, we suggest that in order to avoid any further
controversy in the matter in different parts of the country, the
Ministry of Law, the first respondent, may consider the question
of making suitable amendment to the provisions in so far as
Section 2 of the Act is concerned in the light of other
provisions, if any, containing similar laws relating to Divorce.”
1.5 Thus, it was for the Law Commission’s consideration as to
whether Section 2 of the Divorce Act needed suitable amendment to
enable the Indian courts to entertain a petition for dissolution of a

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Christian marriage where husband has changed his Indian domicile
and his wife is resident in India at the time of presenting the petition.
II. DOMICILE vs. RESIDENCE
2.1 Domicile of a person is his permanent home. No person can be
without a domicile and no person may have more than one operative
domicile. National boundaries do not constitute a hindrance in one’s
choice of domicile. This implies that a person may be national of one
country, but his domicile may be another country. Domicile denotes
the connection of a person with a territorial system of law. The
importance of domicile lies in the fact that a person’s family matters,
like marriage and divorce, are generally determined by the law of the
place of his domicile, besides his religion. The domicile of a married
woman is the same as her husband’s by virtue of marriage.
2.2 There are two main classes of domicile: domicile of origin and
domicile of choice. Domicile of origin is communicated by operation
of law to each person at birth. Domicile of choice is acquired by a
person of full age in substitution for that which he at present
possesses. There are two requisites for acquisition of a fresh
domicile: residence and intention. It must be proved that the person

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in question established his residence in a certain country with the
intention of remaining there permanently. These two elements of
residence and intention must concur, but this is not to say that there
need be unity of time in their concurrence. The intention may either
precede or succeed the establishment of the residence.4
2.3 Domicile generally constitutes the basis of jurisdiction of courts
for entertaining petitions for divorce. Although the matrimonial law in
India differs from community to community, the jurisdictional rules
differ only slightly.5 The time at which domicile is to be determined is
the time when proceedings are commenced.6 In England, the
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 changed the
position of the jurisdictional rule in regard to petitions for divorce and
now the English courts have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
divorce if either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in England
on the date when proceedings are commenced, as now after 1st
January 1974 a married woman can have her own separate domicile.
The said Act not only provides for abolition of wife’s dependent
domicile, but also adopts ‘habitual residence’ as the second basis of
jurisdiction: if either party to the marriage was habitually resident in
England throughout the period of one year ending on the date when
the proceedings are commenced, the English courts have jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for divorce.
2.4 In India, although there has not been enacted any law for
abolition of wife’s dependent domicile, the jurisdictional rule in regard
4 Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 13th edition, Butterworths, London (1999), p. 137
5 Paras Diwan, Private International Law, 4th edition, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi (1998), p. 284
6 Leon v. Leon, [1966] 3 All E R 820

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to petitions for divorce (being linked with domicile of the parties) has
been relaxed in various ways in certain matrimonial legislations. For
example, under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and the Special
Marriage Act 1954, a petition for divorce may be filed by a wife at the
place where she is residing on the date of the presentation of the
petition, vide the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 2003. Sub-section
(2) of section 31 of the Special Marriage Act 1954 even before the
said 2003 Act provided that a petition for divorce by a wife could be
filed here if she had been ordinarily resident in India for a period of
three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
irrespective of the husband’s residence being outside.
2.5 The above amendment brought about by the Marriage Laws
(Amendment) Act 2003 was prompted by the recommendations of
the Law Commission of India7 and the National Commission for
Women. The Law Commission had expressed the view that such an
amendment would give a wife, deserted or thrown out, the choice of
court, including where she is residing, to file a petition, relieving her
of unbearable burden of expense and inconvenience as well as
advancing the cause of gender justice.
2.6 Thus, her residence may well constitute the basis of jurisdiction
for a petition for divorce by a wife irrespective of her domicile.
2.7 Residence means the place where one actually lives, as
distinguished from a domicile. Residence must be bona fide
7 178th Report on Recommendations for amending Various Enactments, both Civil and Criminal (2001)

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residence.8 A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in T. J. Poonen v.
Rathi Varghese9 after considering various decisions gave the
following propositions:
(1) To constitute ‘residence’ it is not necessary that the party or
parties must have his or their own house.
(2) To constitute ‘residence’ the stay need not be permanent; it
can be temporary, so long as there is animus manendi or
an intention to stay for an indefinite period.
(3) ‘Residence’ will not take in a casual stay in, or flying visit to
a particular place; a mere casual residence in a place for a
temporary purpose, with no intention of remaining, is not
covered by the word ‘reside’.
(4) ‘Residence’ connotes something more than stay; it implies
some intention to remain at a place, and not merely to pay
it a casual visit.
(5) As emphasized by the Supreme Court, by staying in a
particular place, in order to constitute ‘residence’, the
intention must be to make it his or their abode or residence,
either permanent or temporary.
(6) The expression ‘last resided’ also means the place where
the person had his last abode or residence, either
permanent or temporary.
(7) Where there has been residence together of a more
permanent character, and a casual or brief residence
together, Courts have taken the view that it is only the
8 Sumathi Ammal v. D. Paul, AIR 1936 Madras 324 (FB)
9 AIR 1967 Kerala 1 (FB)

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former that can be considered as ‘residence together’ for
determining the jurisdiction.
(8) The question as to whether a particular person has chosen
to make a particular place his abode, is to be gathered from
the particular circumstances of each case.
2.8 The jurisdiction of the courts in India to exercise authority under
the Divorce Act 1869 was varied by an amending Act of 1926. Prior
to the amendment of the Divorce Act 1869 in the year 1926 which
came into force from 25th March 1926, the jurisdiction conferred on
the courts in India under the Divorce Act 1869 to make decrees of
dissolution of marriage on the basis of residence was not restricted
to the cases of persons domiciled in India.10 A court could pass a
decree of divorce if the parties to the action resided within the
jurisdiction of the court at the time of the presentation of the petition.
In other words, residential test of the parties was enough and
domicile was not essential to confer jurisdiction on the courts in India
under this Act. Two conditions were required to be satisfied prior to
the amendment of 1926 for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction by
the courts in India at the time of presenting the petition in the court.
But in the case of Keyes v. Keyes11 it was held that the court had no
jurisdiction where the respondent had foreign domicile. In Isharani’s
case12 the test laid down in Keyes’ case13 was not followed. But
accepting the test of the latter case the Indian Divorce Act 1869 was
amended in 1926. By the amendment the courts in India are not
10 Isharani Nirupoma Devi v. Victor Nitendra Narain, AIR 1926 Cal 871
11 [1921] P. 204
12 Supra note 10
13 Supra note 11

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empowered to pass any decree for dissolution of marriage except in
cases where the parties to the marriage are domiciled in India
professing Christian faith at the time of presenting the petition. The
domicile of the wife is the domicile of the husband. It is in accord with
the rule of Private International Law.14
III. 15th REPORT OF THE LAW COMMISSION (1960)
3.1 The 15th Report of the Law Commission of India deals with the
law relating to marriage and divorce amongst Christians in India. The
Commission gave its proposal in the form of a draft Bill titled The
Christian Marriage and Matrimonial Causes Bill 1960. The
Commission recommended that the proposed legislation should
apply to all marriages solemnized within the territories of India
whatever the domicile of the parties thereto, and that it should leave
no vacuum therein. It followed the scheme adopted in the Special
Marriage Act 1954 and the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and also the
pattern of similar legislation in England which binds all persons within
the kingdom. Clause 35 (a) of the said Bill specifically deals with the
jurisdiction of the Indian courts to grant divorce and reads:
14 Supra note 2, pp. 368-369

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“Nothing contained in this Act shall authorize any court –
(a) to make any decree of dissolution of marriage, except
where-
(i) the parties to the marriage are domiciled in
India at the time of the presentation of the
petition; or
(ii) the petitioner, being the wife, was domiciled
in India immediately before the marriage and
has been residing in India for a period of not
less than three years immediately preceding
the presentation of the petition.”
(underlined for emphasis)
3.2 The above Bill proposed by the Law Commission was not
enacted.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
4.1 Section 2 of the Divorce Act 1869 insofar as it concerns the
jurisdictional rule in regard to petitions for divorce is not only not in
tune with the present times but is also harsh upon Christian women
in India.
4.2 We, therefore, feel that Section 2 of the Divorce Act 1869
should be suitably amended in order that the Indian courts shall be
entitled to entertain a petition for dissolution of a Christian marriage
where either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in India at the
time when the petition is presented. However, this suggestion would
also need simultaneous change in the rule of Private International

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Law as to a wife’s domicile, that is, abolition of wife’s dependent
domicile, as done in England through the Domicile and Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1973. In the alternative, following the Marriage Laws
(Amendment) Act 2003, the said provision may be amended to
provide that a petition for divorce may be filed by a Christian wife at
the place where she is residing on the date of the presentation of the
petition.
4.3 It is further felt that for uniformity, similar position should prevail
in regard to all other matrimonial statutes, including the Special
Marriage Act 1954, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936, the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 and the Hindu Marriage
Act 1955.
4.4 We recommend accordingly.
(Dr Justice AR. Lakshmanan)
Chairman
(Prof. Dr Tahir Mahmood) (Dr Brahm A. Agrawal)
Member Member-Secretary

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