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MANU/SC/0635/2004
CASE NOTE HIGHLIGHT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 904 of 2004 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4573/2003)
Decided On: 17.08.2004
Appellants: Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges:
Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, Sr. Adv. and T.G. Narayanan Nair, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: Subramonium Prasad, S. Nanda Kumar, M. Yogesh Kanna, Anuj
Kumar and Rakesh K. Sharma, Advs.
Subject: Criminal
Catch Words:
Assault, Commission of Offence, Common Law, Continuing Offence, Disobedience, Joint Trial,
Judicial Interference, Special Provision
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973 - Sections 177 to 186, 482 and 484; Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 323, 406, 498A and 506; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Section 4
Cases Referred:
Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589; L.N. Mukherjee v. State of
Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1601; Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., AIR
1963 SC 1620; Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., 2001 (4) SCC 350; State of Bihar
v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr., AIR 1973 SC 908; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee, 1997 (5) SCC 30
Prior History:
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.9.2003 of the Madras High Court in Crl. O.P. No. 20942 of
2003
Disposition:
Appeal allowed
Citing Reference:
** Relied On
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Case Note:
Criminal – Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973 - Sections 177 to 186, 482 and 484 -
Territorial jurisdiction – Complaint filed by Respondent 2 alleging commission of offences
punishable under Section 498A, 406, IPC and Section 4 of Dowry prohibition Act –
Application for quashing proceedings filed by appellants on ground that Courts of
Chennai had no jurisdiction to deal with matter as no cause of action having being arisen
there – Plea of Respondent 2 that since offences being continuing in nature in terms of
Section 178 ( c), Chennai Court had jurisdiction to deal with matter – Validity – Evidence
to show that complainant herself left house of husband on 15.4.1997 on account of
alleged dowry demands by husband and his relatives – Since after that there being not
even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act
constituting an offence much less at Chennai – Hence logic of Section 178( c) relating to
continuance of offences held inapplicable – As no part of cause of action having arisen in
Chennai, concerned Court had no jurisdiction – Proceedings held liable to be quashed
Words & Phrases – “Cause of Action” – Meaning of – "Cause of action" has been defined
as meaning, simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to
obtain from the Court a remedy against another person
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the
Madras High Court whereby the appellants' prayer for quashing proceedings in CC 3532 of 2001 on
the file of the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Saidapet,. Chennai, by exercise of powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') was rejected.
Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows :
Respondent No. 2 as complainant filed complaint in the Court of the concerned
magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 (in short the 'Dowry Act'). The magistrate directed the police to investigate
and after investigation charge-sheet was filed by the police. When the matter stood
thus, the appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code before the High
Court alleging that the concerned magistrate has no jurisdiction even to entertain the
complaint even if the allegations contained therein are accepted in toto. According to
them, no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned
Court. The complaint itself disclosed that after 15.4.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil
Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal **
L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras **
Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. **
Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. **
State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. **
Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee **
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and came to Chennai and was staying there. All the allegations which are per se
without any basis took place according to the complainant at Nagercoil, and therefore,
the Courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was
further submitted that earlier a complaint was lodged by the complainant before the
concerned police officials having jurisdiction; but after inquiry no action was deemed
necessary.
3. In response, learned counsel submitted that some of the offences were continuing offences. The
appellant No. 1 had initiated proceedings for judicial separation, the notice for which was received
by her at Chennai and, therefore, the cause of action existed.
4. The High Court unfortunately did not consider rival stands and even did not record any finding
on the question of law raised regarding lack of jurisdiction. It felt that legal parameters were to be
considered after a thorough trial after due opportunity to the parties and, therefore, the factual
points raised by parties were not to be adjudicated under Section 484 of the Code.
5. In support of the appeal Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel, submitted that the
approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. A bare reading of the complaint would go to show
that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court where the complaint
was filed. Therefore, the entire proceedings had no foundation.
6. In response, learned counsel for respondent No. 2-complainant submitted that the offences were
continuing in terms of Section 178(c) of the Code, and therefore The Court had the jurisdiction to
deal with the matter.
7. Section 177 of the Code deals with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, and reads as follows:
" Section 177 : ORDINARY PLACE OF INQUIRY
AND TRIAL:
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction it was committed. "
8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the wellestablished
common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the
proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the
evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to
this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in
Section 178 of the Code which read as follows:
"Section 178 PLACE OF INQUIRY OR TRIAL
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local
areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired
into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. "
9. "All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is
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committed", as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is
''ordinarily". Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject
to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas
Dalmia v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1961 SC 1589), L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras (air
1961 sc 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., (AIR 1963 SC
1620) and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception
implied by the word "ordinarily" need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and
exceptions may be provided by Taw on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law
permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at
hand.
10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr., (AIR 1973 SC
908), continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the
one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the
failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability
continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or
recurs, there is the offence committed.
11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata
Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the allegations
related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the
factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband
of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This
Court held in that factual background that Clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the
present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the
husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations.
There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of
any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of
the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.
12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was
committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.
13. While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as
stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is
committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different.
The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.
14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the
legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with
the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the
opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause
of action would possibly accrue or would arise.
15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted
sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate
occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance
of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the
right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the
complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the
Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence,
which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action".
16. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea
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of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no
more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of
material facts.
17. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts
that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving
rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy
in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire
set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if
traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edn. )
the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of
those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.
18. In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows:
"Cause of action" has been defined as meaning, simply a factual situation the existence
of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person.
The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to
be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would
have a right to traverse. "Cause of action" has also been taken to mean that particular
act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the
subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of
action".
19. When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the
complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action
arose in Chennai and, therefore, the concerned magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent No. 2 who, if she
so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The
appeal is accordingly allowed.
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