Supreme Court: False 406 overruled, Bhaskar Lal Sharma Vs Monica, 27.07.2009, Justice S.B. Sinha & Justice Cyriac Joseph

Supreme Court: False 406 overruled, Bhaskar Lal Sharma Vs Monica, 27.07.2009, Justice S.B. Sinha & Justice Cyriac Joseph


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2009
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 4125-4126 of 2008]

BHASKAR LAL SHARMA & ANR. …APPELLANTS
Versus
MONICA …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T
S.B. SINHA, J:

Leave granted.

Respondent Monica married Vikas Sharma (Vikas), son of the
appellants herein. Vikas was a divorcee. He obtained the decree of divorce
on or about 8th July, 2003 passed by the Civil Court in Lubumbashi, Congo.
He had two children born on 23rd April, 1999 and 8th July, 2000 respectively
from his first wife.
Indisputably, Vikas as also the appellants are engaged in the family
business of import and export of about 150 commodities. Vikas was the
Managing Director of the family managed Company since 1994 having its
operating business places at Delhi, Bangkok, Shanghai, Brussels,
Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Uganda, etc. Vikas and the
appellants ordinarily live in Congo. They have a residential house also at
Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi.
Negotiation between Vikas and the respondent – Monica took place
through an agency known as ‘Sycorian Matrimonial Services’. The
marriage took place at Sanatan Dharam Mandir Hall, Delhi on 16.1.2004. It
was also registered with the Registrar of Marriages, MB Road Saket, New
Delhi on 22.1.2004. Immediately thereafter, i.e., on or about 25.1.2004, the
couple left India and stayed in Johannesburg, South Africa for about 10
days. They thereafter left for Lubumbashi, Conga, Africa. They stayed
there for 2 months in their matrimonial home. The relationship between the
parties was cordial during that period.
Monica came back to India on 5.4.2004. She stayed at her
matrimonial home at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi till 10.5.2004 with the

2
appellants. She again left for Lubumbashi, Africa to join her husband.
However, the relationship between the parties deteriorated thereafter. They
came back to India on 21.5.2004. Monica allegedly took all her belongings
from Congo including clothes and the jewelry which she had been carrying.
On or about 26.5.2004, Vikas and the respondent visited Dr. Nagpal, a
psychiatrist at Vim Hans Hospital for consultation to ascertain the reason for
the non-compatibility and discord between them. Dr. Nagpal advised them
to make their matrimonial life successful.
Vikas left for Congo on 27.5.2004 hoping that Monica would change
her mind in regard to the future of their marriage and they should take a
decision in regard to her going back thereto later. She, however, for one
reason or the other, went to her parent’s house on 14.6.2004 and took all her
belongings including the jewelry articles which she had been carrying.
Allegedly, during that period, appellant No.2 humiliated her by
various acts to which we would advert to a little later.
It is borne out from the records that during this entire period including
the period after she left her matrimonial home in June 2004, parties
communicated with each other through e-mails.

3
Monica filed a complaint marked as Complaint No. 287/1A under
Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”)
against her husband Vikas and the appellants on 9.9.2004. On the same day,
an application for grant of maintenance was also filed in the Court of learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi
under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, “the Code”)
claiming maintenance of a sum of Rs.2 lakhs per month as also an order of
an interim maintenance of Rs.2 lakhs per month till the disposal of the case.
She was examined by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Patiala House,
New Delhi on 30.11.2004. Evidences were recorded whereafter summons
had been issued on 21.3.2005 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. Her
application for grant of interim maintenance was also allowed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate by an order dated 10.5.2005 and granted interim
maintenance at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month.
Non bailable warrants of arrest were also issued against the appellants
as also Vikas on 29.6.2005.
The respondent being not satisfied with the quantum of maintenance
as granted by way of an interim arrangement filed a Revision Application
before the High Court marked as Criminal Revision No. 452 of 2005

4
seeking increase in the maintenance granted by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation of
interim maintenance to Rs.50,000/- per month. The amount of maintenance
has since been fixed at Rs.50,000/- per month by the said Court.
On or about 2.8.2005, appellants as also Vikas filed application
marked as Criminal (Misc.) No. 3673-75 of 2005 under Section 482 of the
Code before the Delhi High Court for quashing the order directing issuance
of non-bailable warrants against them. The High Court by its order dated
8.8.2005 stayed the order issuing non-bailable warrants against the
appellants with an undertaking that Vikas and appellants would appear
before the learned Magistrate.
Appellants along with Vikas also filed an application marked as
Criminal (Misc.) Main No. 4742 of 2005 under Section 482 of the Code for
quashing of the summoning order dated 21.3.2005 passed by the learned
Magistrate in Complaint No.287/1A summoning them for attending the trial
court under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the IPC.
On 3.10.2005, appellants and their son came to India; they appeared
before the learned Magistrate; they were admitted to bail.

5
The High Court by its order dated 4.10.2005 passed in Criminal
Revision No. 452 of 2005 directed impounding of the passport of Vikas
stating that the efforts were being made for reconciliation. Admittedly talks
of reconciliation failed. The High Court modified the said finding stating
that the marriage seems to have broken down irretrievably and directed
return of the passport to him by an order dated 6.10.2005. Pursuant to the
liberty granted by the High Court, appellants as also Vikas filed an
application on 15.10.2005 for permission to go abroad, which was allowed
subject to the condition that additional bank guarantees be furnished of Rs.1
lakh for each of the applicant.
Monica challenged the said order before the High Court which was
dismissed by an order dated 18.10.2005.
On 21.11.2005, Monica filed a Criminal Complaint No.574/1 under
Section 420 of the IPC against the appellants and Vikas inter alia alleging all
material facts relating to the first marriage and divorce and in particular the
fact that the first wife of Vikas in her divorce suit alleged acts of cruelty on
the part of her husband had not been disclosed.

6
On 12.12.2005, Monica challenged the order of the Delhi High Court
dated 18.10.2005 before this Court by way of Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No. 6015-6016 of 2005, which was dismissed by an order dated
12.12.2005.
Despite the same, Monica filed another petition before the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code inter alia praying that the learned trial court
may be directed not to release the passport of Vikas till the application filed
by her under Section 340 of the Code is disposed off.
Another petition marked as Criminal Misc. (Main) No. 519 of 2006
was filed by her for a direction upon the learned trial court to dispose of the
case filed by her under Sections 498A/406 IPC and 420 IPC within a time
frame of about 3 months and the appellants as also Vikas be directed to
submit all the papers relating to their properties in India before the learned
trial court.
The High Court by its order dated 7.2.2006 dismissed the petition
filed by the respondent with costs.

7
On 20.3.2006, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi took
cognizance of the complaint No. 574/1 under Section 417/415 IPC as the
allegations were not made out under Section 420.
On 27.3.2006, the order dated 7.2.2006 passed by the High court was
challenged by the respondent before this Court by way of Special Leave
Petition (Criminal) No.1220 of 2006, which was dismissed with a direction
to the trial court to expedite the proceedings.
Indisputably for one reason or the other (appellants had given some
explanation in this behalf in the Special Leave Petition) appellants having
failed to attend the court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Monica
filed an application for attachment of the ancestral property of the first
appellant. Interpol also was sounded. Orders were passed for attachment of
the property in terms of Section 83 of the Code situated both at Delhi as also
the ancestral house of the first appellant at Jaipur. Although the order of
attachment so far as the Jaipur property is concerned is said to have been
passed in terms of Section 83(4)(c) of the Code, Monica allegedly forged the
said order to show that the order of attachment has been passed in terms of
Section 83(4)(a) thereof.

8
Brother of the first appellant lodged a First Information Report
(“FIR”) with Moti Dungri Police Station, Jaipur. We are, however, not
concerned with the said case at present.
Indisputably on 17.11.2007, Monica filed a petition under Section 9 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking for restitution of conjugal rights
marked as Case No. 683 of 2007, which is pending in the Court of learned
Additional District Judge, Tis Hazari, New Delhi.
We may place on record that at the instance of Monica several
attempts have been made for reconciliation of matrimonial dispute between
her and Vikas.
We may also place on record that applications dated 9.5.2008 and
31.5.2008 respectively were also filed before this Court by the respondent
for mediation
Chandan Sharma, another son of the appellants came from Hong
Kong to India for that purpose. Monica, however, insisted that appellant
No.1 himself should come to India before her husband Vikas comes, which
was not acceptable to the appellants as the reconciliation of the disputes was
to take place between Monica and her husband Vikas.

9
We may notice that even this Court in the transfer petition filed by
Monica being Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 258 of 2007 by its order dated
4.2.2008 impleaded Union of India through Ministry of External Affairs as a
party and learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for Union of India
made a statement before this Court on 11.4.2008 that Emergency Travel
Documents would be made available to Vikas and upon his arrival a regular
passport would be issued. Interpol/Ministry of External Affairs were
directed not to enforce the Red Corner Notice against Vikas Sharma.
Pursuant thereto Vikas traveled to India.
On 9.5.2008, Vikas appeared before this Court in Transfer Petition
(Criminal) No. 258/2007 and this Court by an order dated 9.5.2008 directed
the complainant and Vikas to report to the Senior Coordinator of the
Mediation Cell at Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi to explore the possibilities of
resolving/settlement of their matrimonial discord. Pursuant thereto the
parties appeared before the learned Senior Mediator and the mediation
processes were resorted to on day to day basis. Indisputably however, the
said negotiation failed. The matter was listed before this Court on

10
11.6.2008. The parties were given an opportunity to reconcile their disputes.
However, they could not arrive at any settlement.
The High Court by reason of the impugned order dated 21.1.2008
dismissed the application for quashing the summoning order dated
21.3.2005 filed by the appellants herein, opining:
“14. In order to attract the offence under Section
498A it would have to be proved that the wife was
subjected to cruelty which could include mental
cruelty. Whether the conduct was such as to cause
grave injury or danger to the mental health of the
woman are all matters to be examined only after
the detailed evidence is led by the prosecution. At
this stage, when a prayer is made for quashing of
the criminal proceedings, this Court is not
expected to go through the pre-summoning
evidence in great detail and determine whether in
fact all the ingredients of the offence as set out
under Section 498A are actually made out or not.
15. Likewise the submission of the petitioners
regarding non-entrustment of property to them by
the complainant for the purposes of attracting the
offence under Sections 403 read with 406 IPC is
without merit. It was attempted to be shown by
learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no
specific averment that property was entrusted by
the complainant to either of these petitioners or
that they had criminally misappropriated the same.
This Court is unable to agree. The averments in
paras 16, 24 and 29 of the complaint when read
taken collectively do indicate that the property
which belonged to the complainant was, according
to the complainant, in the possession of the
Petitioners and on demand they refused to return

11
such property. At this stage, in order to examine if
the complaint makes out a prima facie case, it is
not necessary to go into the fine details and
determine whether what is stated in the complaint
is true or not.
16. In this context the observations of the
Supreme Court in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada (1997) 2 SCC 397 would be
relevant. In that case while examining Section 406
in some detail, this Court observed as under (SCC
p. 407): The expression entrustment carries with it
the implication that the person handing over any
property or on whose behalf that property is
handed over to another, continues to be its owner.
Entrustment is not necessarily a term of law. It
may have different implications in different
contexts. In its most general signifance, all its
imports is handing over the possession for some
purpose which may not imply the conferment of
any proprietary right therein. The ownership or
beneficial interest in the property in respect of
which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have
been committed, must be in some person other
than the accused and the latter must hold it on
account of some person or in some way for his
benefit.”
Mr. Vikas Pahwa, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants urged that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the
impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that:
i. the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be
correct in its entirety does not disclose commission of offences

12
either under Section 498A or Section 406 of the IPC so far as
the appellants are concerned;
ii. the order summoning the appellants passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi dated 21.3.2005 would
categorically show that there has been a complete nonapplication
of mind on the part of the learned Magistrate;
iii. The High Court failed to consider the e-mails exchanged
between the parties which were annexed to the complaint
petition itself. Had the said e-mails been taken into
consideration, it could have been shown that no allegation of
dowry demand or misappropriation of her Streedhan had been
made therein;
iv. the complaint petition does not disclose that any dowry has
been demanded by the appellants or any act on their part was
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide; which are the
requisite ingredients in regard to commission of an offence
under Section 498A of the IPC.
v. Only two purported instances have been given with regard to
alleged commission of an offence against the appellant No.1

13
and so far as the appellant No.2 is concerned, the allegations are
only general in nature.
vi. The FIR in question and other spate of litigations started by
Monica against her husband and her parents-in-law clearly
show acts of mala fide on her part inasmuch as she not only
filed the complaint petition in question but also filed an
application for grant of maintenance, a complaint petition under
Section 420 of the IPC wherein an order of summoning had
been issued as also an application under Section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 for the purpose of harassing her in-laws but
at the same time she had been asking for mediation of their
matrimonial dispute.
Mrs. Vinay Malhotra, the mother of the respondent, on the other hand,
urged that:
i. the appellants had been harassing and torturing the respondent
in a systematic and planned manner to break her marriage with
their son so as to compel her to agree for a divorce on receiving
some amount.

14
ii. Stridhan was entrusted to the appellants/their son and nonreturn
thereof had been used as a coercive method to meet the
unlawful demand of extracting divorce by mutual consent
iii. Appellants had been taking different stands at different time as
although no statement has been made before the High Court
that they had returned the stridhan to the respondent; such a
stand has been taken for the first time in the Special Leave
Petition.
iv. the respondent in her testimony having stated that the appellants
had refused to call their son to India and had refused to return
the Stridhan unless the proposal for divorce by mutual consent
was accepted by her, sufficiently established the offence against
them.
v. the appellants having admitted offering of money to the
respondent for obtaining divorce by mutual consent must be
held to be guilty of commission of offences.
vi. the appellants having offered a sum of Rs.25 lakhs for divorce
by mutual consent would clearly go to show their mind-set that

15
they have been considering the marriage only in monetary
terms and not of any emotional values.
The Parliament by Act No. 46 of 1983 with a view to combat the
menace of dowry deaths and harassment to woman at the hands of her
husband or his relatives introduced Section 498A and Section 304B in the
IPC.
Section 498A reads as under:
“498-A. Husband or relative of husband or a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.-- Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband of
a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine.”
The ‘Explanation’ appended thereto defines cruelty to mean: (i) any
willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
whether mental or physical of the woman; or (ii) harassment of the woman
where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such
demand.

16
Thus, the essential ingredients of the aforementioned provisions are:
. 1. A woman must be married.
2. She must be subjected to cruelty.
3. Cruelty must be of the nature of:
(i) any willful conduct as was likely to drive such woman:
a. to commit suicide;
b. cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb,
either mental or physical;
(ii) harassment of such woman, (1) with a view to coerce her
to meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security, (2)
or on account of failure of such woman or by any of her relation
to meet the unlawful demand,
(iii) woman was subjected to such cruelty by: (1) husband of
that woman, or (2) any relative of the husband.
For constitution an offence under Section 498A of the IPC, therefore,
the ingredients thereof must be held to be existing.
For proving the offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the
complainant must make allegation of harassment to the extent so as to

17
coerce her to meet any unlawful demand of dowry, or any willful conduct on
the part of the accused of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. We
do not find any such allegation has been made or otherwise can be found out
so as to enable us to arrive at an opinion that the appellants prima facie have
committed such an offence.
The complaint petition must also be read with several other
documents which form part of the complaint petition. The children from the
first wife of Vikas were with Monica. Vikas affirmed an affidavit so as to
enable Monica to apply for their passports. Vikas, therefore, wanted to have
children with them.
Monica sent an e-mail on 5.6.2004 to his mother stating that Vikas
sent an e-mail to her on 4.6.2004, which reads thus:
“My love bubbly.
Don’t worry everything will be fine. I am very
happy to have found a person like you, who loves
durjaya and surya like me. Mona, pls. pray to
Krishna to help me and help us to do the right
thing. I want to change my life to better, I want to
become a sincere devotee of the Lord, I never want
to drink again, it puts me down. I want to pray
regularly, we must organize our time together to
pray to the lord, we must serve him together and

18
everything will be alright. Pls. try to go everyday
to the temple and pray to the Lord for us and our
children, don’t worry all will be ok. I am sorry to
have caused you so much pain, I will make it up to
you, promise. I love you my dear, take care.
HARE KRISHNA
Baba.”
In an e-mail sent to everybody concerned explaining her behaviour
vis-à-vis those of Vikas, she referred to even the e-mails which was sent by
Vikas to her to his mother.
It is not possible for us to deal with the contents of the e-mails in great
details but it is evident that the couple had developed incompatibility in
respect of various aspects of life including the one as to whether Monica did
a favour to Vikas by marrying him. They also include the children, her going
out of the home without informing any senior member of the house,
allegation of extra marital affairs against Vikas; her taking of detergent
powder evidently to commit suicide; they had been staying in separate
rooms, differences in respect of carrying of business, her becoming
hysterical at some point of time. Vikas even thought that she had been
trying to black-mail him by refusing to go back to India and threatening to
commit suicide. The e-mails shows allegations, counter allegations and

19
explanations by Monica in relation thereto. In an e-mail dated 19.6.2004 by
Vikas, it was stated:
“I have given a lot of thought to our situation and
as you told me many times before and yesterday
also, that may be it is better that we split, I think
that yes it is better to do so. We both are not at all
compatible to each other monica. And it is not a
wise decision to live this kind of life. I am not
interested to living 2 different lives in the same
house as you had once commented, I think this was
on our first flight to Dubai. Anyway Monica I
don’t want anymore of this and neither do you, we
both have a lot of things we can do with our lives,
and I want to carry on now.
I am also going to leave congo and go somewhere
else, I am presently talking to dad about going on
my own, but its not easy as I don’t have any
money and only dad can give me something to
help me, anyway, congo is finished, I hate that
place.
I am not blaming you for anything, but it is better
that we part, you also know this is better, and
better to swallow the pain now then live our lives
like this.
I am sorry.
Vikas.”
In one of the e-mails Vinay Malhotra alleges humiliation by appellant
No.2.

20
On 14.8.2004, Vikas writes to his father-in-law by e-mail, which reads
as under:
“I have never written nasty emails to your
daughter, on the contrary I always respected her
and sent her lovely and sometimes erotic emails to
light up our love life. But her nagging and lies that
she has kept on telling you have made it difficult
for me to try to live with a person like her. Your
daughter on many occasions threatened me by
trying to suicide for example trying to jump out of
a running car, drinking poisonous substance,
breaking things in my house, etc. When she does
not get her way she goes bizark. And not only
with me but on several occasions she fought with
my parents, this for me is difficult to accept. I
have always been truthful to you and her, and if
you think otherwise then do as you please. I am
not interested in continuing my relationship with
your daughter, this is how I feel and I believe that
we would not be happy together.
I have already asked my parents to speak to you
and do what has to be done in a civilized manner.
If your daughter thinks that I have insulted her or
hurt her in anyway then frankly she has some
mental problem, I have done nothing wrong, if I
had done so then why until last week she was so
eager to come back to me, when I have told her
already that I don’t think we can live together. I
will not be coming to India. I am too busy and I
have asked my parents to settle this with you,
please remember that if you try to throw dirt on me
I will not stay put, I will protect my reputation.
This can go as far as you want, I don’t fear
anything because I have nothing to fear.
I hope that you will do what is best for everyone,
the ball in is your court.”

21
A counter allegation was made by Anil Malhotra to Vikas, which
reads as under:
“After marriage things went well for sometime and
then suddenly you started crying foul. You along
with my daughter came back to India on 25th May
2004. You profusely apologized for treatment
meted out to my daughter and reassured to behave
in future and that you were a gentleman. You and
my daughter stayed at your parents place during
your India visit when things appeared to be falling
in line. You left for Africa on 27th May 2004
leaving behind my daughter at your parental house
so that she could spend sometime with your
parents and then join you in South Africa after 10
days. After returning to Africa, for sometime you
kept on sending apologetic emails to my daughter
and then suddenly you told my daughter that you
were tired of hearing trivial complaints against her
from your mother. Thereafter, you started writing
nasty emails to my daughter, which is to your
knowledge.
The main purpose of my writing this email is to
express that anything that has to be done should be
done with a human face. For that matter you
should come to India within a week’s time.
Suggesting you to re introspect may be a futile
exercise. Rest assured, we are capable of meeting
any situation in dealing with a gentleman or a
deceit.
May like to reply to this email.”

22
There are many more e-mails exchanged between the couple as also
their parents. However, in none of them any allegation with regard to cruelty
or breach of trust had been made. Such allegations are made for the first
time in the complaint petition as also in the application for grant of
maintenance.
Respondent, in her complaint petition, made the following allegations
against the appellants, which we may notice:
Appellant No.1
SH. BHASKAR LAL SHARMA –
FATHER IN LAW
Appellant No.2
SMT. VIMLA SHARMA –
(MOTHER IN LAW)
1. He threatened the Complainant to
finish her relationship with Mr.
Vikas Sharma as she was trying to
control their house, children and the
business (page 57)
1. She sent only two unmarried girls
for Shagun instead of seven (page
42)
2. He offered divorce by mutual
consent on the payment of Rs.25 lacs
as compensation. He also refused to
return the clothes/jewelry unless the
divorce by mutual consent is granted
by the complainant (Page 63)
2. She said that she would like the
function of Engagement Ceremony
to be organized in a 5 Star Hotel
(page 43)

23
3. She also advised the respondents
to hold the marriage ceremony at
Iscon Temple (page 44)
4. She also took all the gifts/cash
given by the invitees/guests (page
46)
5. She made complaints on trivial
matters. She kicked the respondent
with her leg and told that her mother
is a liar (page 51)
6. She poisoned the ears of her son
(page 52).
7. She gave two used lady suits of
her daughter to the Complainant
(page 57).
8. She gave perpetual sermons to the
Complainant (page 58)
9. She told her son Vikas Sharma
over phone that kids do not like
anything prepared by the
Complainant (page 59)
10. She humiliated and harassed by

24
repeatedly saying that her son would
be divorced for the second time
whereas the Complainant would be
divorced for the first time.
Ex facie no case has been made out under Section 498A of the IPC so
far as the appellants are concerned.
The allegations relating to the place where the marriage took place has
nothing to do with an offence under Section 498A of the IPC. Allegations
that appellant No.2 kicked the respondent with her leg and told her that her
mother to be a liar may make out some other offence but not the one
punishable under Section 498A. Similarly her allegations that the appellant
No.2 poisoned the ears of her son against the respondent; she gave two used
lady suits of her daughter to the complainant and has been given perpetual
sermons to the complainant could not be said to be offences punishable
under Section 498A. Even threatening that her son may be divorced for the
second time could not bring out the offence under Section 498A of the IPC.
The scope of the aforementioned provision came up for consideration
in some of the decisions of this Court. We may notice a few.

25
In Noorjahan vs. State rep. by D.S.P, [(2008) 11 SCC 55], this Court
held:
“16. Consequences of cruelty which are likely to
drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether
mental or physical, of the woman is required to be
established in order to bring home the application
of Section 498-A IPC. Cruelty has been defined in
the Explanation for the purpose of Section 498-A.
Substantive Section 498-A IPC and presumptive
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act have been
inserted in the respective statutes by the Criminal
Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983. It is to be
noted that Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC cannot
be held to be mutually inclusive. These provisions
deal with two distinct offences. It is true that
cruelty is a common essential to both the sections
and that has to be proved. The Explanation to
Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”.
17. The object for which Section 498-A IPC was
introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of
Objects and Reasons while enacting the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 (46 of 1983). As
clearly stated therein the increase in the number of
dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The
extent of the evil has been commented upon by the
Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the
work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some
cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of
the husband which culminate in suicide by or
murder of the helpless woman concerned,
constitute only a small fraction involving such
cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC,
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the
Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only
with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of
cruelty to married women by the husband, in-laws
and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the
menace of dowry death and cruelty.”
It was observed in the fact situation obtaining therein:

26
“18. So far as the present appellant is concerned,
the evidence is inadequate to show that she was
party to any demand for dowry. In fact, PW 1
stated that when she went to the place of her
daughter the appellant was present along with A-1
and A-2. The said A-1 demanded jewels and
presentation of Rs. 5000 for Ramzan. She accepted
that she told A-1 and A-2 that she will send the
same within a week. The next statement of this
witness is very significant. She (the appellant) told
that two months’ time will be sufficient for
offering the presentation. In other words, she did
not make any demand for dowry. That aspect has
been accepted by PW 1. Significantly, this witness
in her cross-examination had admitted that the
appellant is residing at Coimbatore for the last 35
years. She has categorically admitted that while
she went to the house of her daughter, she (the
appellant) was not present. Therefore, there is no
evidence to show that the appellant was either
present when the demand was made or she herself
made any demand.”
In Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2005) 6 SCC
281], this Court held:
“10. The object for which Section 498-A IPC
was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement
of Objects and Reasons while enacting the
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 46 of
1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in the
number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious
concern. The extent of the evil has been
commented upon by the Joint Committee of the
Houses to examine the work of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of
the husband and the relatives of the husband which
culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless
woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction
involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed
to amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short “CrPC”) and the Evidence Act
suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of
dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married
women by the husband, in-laws and relatives. The
avowed object is to combat the menace of dowry
death and cruelty.

27
19. The object of the provision is prevention of
the dowry menace. But as has been rightly
contended by the petitioner many instances have
come to light where the complaints are not bona
fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In
such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all
cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and
prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage
adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what
remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse
of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because
the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does
not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to
wreak personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It
may, therefore, become necessary for the
legislature to find out ways how the makers of
frivolous complaints or allegations can be
appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have
to take care of the situation within the existing
framework. As noted above the object is to strike
at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the
provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed.
The provision is intended to be used as a shield
and not as an assassin’s weapon. If the cry of
“wolf” is made too often as a prank, assistance and
protection may not be available when the actual
“wolf” appears. There is no question of the
investigating agency and courts casually dealing
with the allegations. They cannot follow any
straitjacket formula in the matters relating to
dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost
sight of that the ultimate objective of every legal
system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty
and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any
preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously
argued by the petitioner that the investigating
agencies and the courts start with the presumptions
that the accused persons are guilty and that the
complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide
and generalised a statement. Certain statutory
presumptions are drawn which again are
rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the
investigating agencies and the courts is that of a
watchdog and not of a bloodhound. It should be
their effort to see that an innocent person is not
made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless
and malicious allegations. It is equally
undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence
is available and the courts have to act on
circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such
cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial
evidence has to be kept in view.”

28
The jurisdiction of the High Court to quash an order of summoning
and/or a criminal proceeding as also this Court are well known. The parties
have relied upon the decisions of this Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan
Lal [1992 (Supp.) 1 SCC 335]. We may notice the categories 1, 3, 5 and 7
mentioned in Para 102 of the said decision, which are as under:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”

29
{See also Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu &
Anr. [2009 (4) SCALE 685], Kailashi Bai vs. Aarti Arya & Anr. [2009 (7)
SCALE 304}
Does this case fall under any of the categories is the question.
Before however, we consider the necessary ingredients of the
aforementioned dicta vis-à-vis the facts involved in the present case, we may
also notice some other decisions of this Court.
In Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. [2008
(1) JCC 65], this Court opined as under:
“18. In the present case, from a plain reading of the
complaint filed by the complainant on 8-11-1994,
extracted above, it is clear that the facts mentioned
in the complaint, taken on their face value, do not
make out a prima facie case against the appellants
for having dishonestly misappropriated the
stridhan of the complainant, allegedly handed over
to them, thereby committing criminal breach of
trust punishable under Section 406 IPC. It is
manifestly clear from the afore extracted complaint
as also the relevant portion of the charge-sheet that
there is neither any allegation of entrustment of
any kind of property by the complainant to the
appellants nor its misappropriation by them.
Furthermore, it is also noted in the charge-sheet
itself that the complainant had refused to take
articles back when this offer was made to her by
the investigating officer. Therefore, in our opinion,
the very prerequisite of entrustment of the property
and its misappropriation by the appellants are
lacking in the instant case. We have no hesitation
in holding that the learned Additional Sessions
Judge and the High Court erred in law in coming
to the conclusion that a case for framing of charge
under Section 406 IPC was made out.
19. As regards the applicability of Section 498-A
IPC, in the complaint dated 8-11-1994 there is not

30
even a whisper of a wilful conduct of Appellants 1
and 2 of harassment of the complainant at their
hands with a view to coercing her to meet any
unlawful demand by them so as to attract the
provisions of Section 498-A read with Explanation
thereto. The complaint refers to the talk the
complainant purports to have had with her
husband, Appellant 3, who is alleged to have told
her to come to Bijnore if she apologises to his
father; keeps him happy; obeys his sister and talks
to her father (the complainant’s) to give her
Rs.50,000 and VCR and brings these articles to
Bijnore. We are convinced that the allegation of
misbehaviour on the part of Appellants 1 and 2 and
the demand of Rs. 50,000 and VCR by them made
by the complainant in her subsequent statement
dated 4-4-1995, was an afterthought and not bona
fide.”
In Ramesh & Ors. vs. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507], it was
opined:
“6. Before we proceed to deal with the two
contentions relating to limitation and territorial
jurisdiction, we would like to consider first the
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant
Gowri Ramaswamy. Looking at the allegations in
the FIR and the contents of charge-sheet, we hold
that none of the alleged offences viz. Sections 498-
A, 406 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act are made out against her. She is the married
sister of the informant’s husband who is
undisputedly living in Delhi with her family.
Assuming that during the relevant time i.e.
between March and October 1997, when the 6th
respondent (informant) lived in Mumbai in her
marital home, the said lady stayed with them for
some days, there is nothing in the complaint which
connects her with an offence under Section 498-A
or any other offence of which cognizance was
taken. Certain acts of taunting and ill-treatment of
the informant by her sister-in-law (the appellant)
were alleged but they do not pertain to dowry
demand or entrustment and misappropriation of
property belonging to the informant. What was
said against her in the FIR is that on some

31
occasions, she directed the complainant to wash
WC and she used to abuse her and used to pass
remarks such as “even if you have got much
jewellery, you are our slave”. It is further stated in
the report that Gowri would make wrong
imputations to provoke her husband and would
warn her that nobody could do anything to her
family. These allegations, even if true, do not
amount to harassment with a view to coercing the
informant or her relation to meet an unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security. At
the most, the allegations reveal that her sister-inlaw
Gowri was insulting and making derogatory
remarks against her and behaving rudely against
her. Even acts of abetment in connection with
unlawful demand for property/dowry are not
alleged against her. The bald allegations made
against her sister-in-law seem to suggest the
anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the
husband’s relations as possible. Neither the FIR
nor the charge-sheet furnished the legal basis to the
Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences
alleged against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy.
The High Court ought not to have relegated her to
the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings
against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy are
hereby quashed and her appeal stands allowed.”
In Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu &
Anr. [supra], it is stated:
“17. The aforesaid discussion clearly pin-point
the legal position on the subject which is by now
well settled. The principle that could be culled out
is that when at an initial stage a prosecution is
asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the
court is as to whether the uncontroverted
allegations as made in the complaint filed prima
facie establish the offence. It is also for the court
to take into consideration any special feature that
may appear in a particular case while considering

32
whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice
to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on
the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any
oblique purpose. The tests that are laid down in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) are required to be
applied very carefully and minutely when a prayer
for quashing is laid down before the Court.”
In Devendra & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [2009 (7) SCALE 613],
it has been held:
“26. There is no dispute with regard to the
aforementioned propositions of law. However, it
is now well-settled that the High Court ordinarily
would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the
allegations made in the First Information Report,
even if given face value and taken to be correct in
their entirety, do not make out any offence. When
the allegations made in the First Information
Report or the evidences collected during
investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an
offence, the superior courts would not encourage
harassment of a person in a criminal court for
nothing.”
Reliance has been placed by Mr. Malhotra on the decision of this
Court in Mahila Vinod Kumari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [2008 (10)
SCALE 97]. We are not concerned with the same as the same deals with the
question of perjury.

33
The complainant further did not stop there but also filed a complaint
petition that she was cheated as Vikas and his parents did not disclose about
his marital state of affairs in regard to the first marriage and/or the decree of
divorce obtained by him. We do not intend to make any comment with
regard to the correctness or otherwise of the statements made therein as the
matter is not before us.
We have, however, made note of the litigations filed between the
parties in great detail. These litigations, if a holistic view is taken, depict a
sad state of affairs, namely, that the respondent, on the one hand, intends to
take all coercive measures to secure the presence of her husband and the
appellants in India in various cases filed by her and, on the other hand, she
had repeatedly been making attempts of conciliation.
Endeavour/conciliations were made by the Delhi High Court as also this
Court at various stages. The High Court, as indicated hereinbefore, in its
order dated 6.10.2005 passed in Criminal Revision No. 452 of 2005
categorically held that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Be that
as it may, we are of the opinion that keeping in view the ingredients of the
provisions of Sections 498A of the IPC, no case has been made out against
the appellants herein.

34
We may now consider the question as to whether the complaint
petition discloses any offence under Section 406 of the IPC.
At the outset, we may notice as to what is ‘Streedhana’
In Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC
397], the meaning of Stridhana has been taken from Mayne’s Hindu Law &
Usage (13th Edn.). It was opined:
“9. A woman’s power of disposal, independent
of her husband’s control, is not confined to
saudayika but extends to other properties as well.
Devala says: “A woman’s maintenance (vritti),
ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains (labha), are
her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive right to
enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except
in distress....” In N.R. Raghavachariar’s Hindu
Law — Principles and Precedents, (8th Edn.)
edited by Prof. S. Venkataraman, one of the
renowned Professors of Hindu Law para 468 deals
with “Definition of Stridhana”. In para 469 dealing
with “Sources of acquisition” it is stated that the
sources of acquisition of property in a woman’s
possession are: gifts before marriage, wedding
gifts, gifts subsequent to marriage etc. Para 470
deals with “Gifts to a maiden”. Para 471 deals with
“Wedding gifts” and it is stated therein that
properties gifted at the time of marriage to the
bride, whether by relations or strangers, either
Adhiyagni or Adhyavahanika, are the bride’s
stridhana. In para 481 at page 426, it is stated that
ornaments presented to the bride by her husband or
father constitute her Stridhana property. In para
487 dealing with “powers during coverture” it is
stated that saudayika meaning the gift of
affectionate kindred, includes both Yautaka or
gifts received at the time of marriage as well as its
negative Ayautaka. In respect of such property,

35
whether given by gift or will she is the absolute
owner and can deal with it in any way she likes.
She may spend, sell or give it away at her own
pleasure.
10. It is thus clear that the properties gifted to
her before the marriage, at the time of marriage or
at the time of giving farewell or thereafter are her
stridhana properties. It is her absolute property
with all rights to dispose at her own pleasure. He
has no control over her stridhana property.
Husband may use it during the time of his distress
but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore
the same or its value to his wife. Therefore,
stridhana property does not become a joint
property of the wife and the husband and the
husband has no title or independent dominion over
the property as owner thereof.”
It was furthermore held:
“…The expression “entrustment” carries with it
the implication that the person handing over any
property or on whose behalf that property is
handed over to another, continues to be its owner.
Entrustment is not necessarily a term of law. It
may have different implications in different
contexts. In its most general significance, all its
imports is handing over the possession for some
purpose which may not imply the conferment of
any proprietary right therein. The ownership or
beneficial interest in the property in respect of
which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have
been committed, must be in some person other
than the accused and the latter must hold it on
account of some person or in some way for his
benefit….”
The offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in Section 405 of
the IPC may be held to have been committed when a person who had been
entrusted in any manner with the property or has otherwise dominion over it,

36
dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to his own use, or dishonestly
uses it, or disposes it of, in violation of any direction of law prescribing the
mode in which the trust is to be discharged, or of any lawful contract,
express or implied, made by him touching such discharge, or willfully
suffers any other person so to do.
The essential ingredients for establishing an offence of criminal breach of
trust as defined in Section 405 and punishable under Section 406 IPC with
sentence for a period up to three years or with fine or with both, are:
(i) entrusting any person with property or with any dominion over
property;
(ii) the person entrusted dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his
own use that property; or dishonestly using or disposing of that property or
wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation of any direction of
law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any
legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust.
We have noticed heretobefore that the correspondences exchanged
between the spouses or by and between Vikas and his in-laws do not
disclose any allegation which would amount to criminal misconduct on the
part of the appellants.

37
With the aforementioned backdrop of events, we may now notice the
allegations made in the complaint petition filed by the respondent against the
appellants.
The only allegation which brings the case within the purview of
Section 406 is that appellant No.2 had taken all the gifts/cash given by the
invitees/guests. Technically, this allegation would attract the definition of
breach of trust within the meaning of Section 405 of the IPC.
Entrustment of some properties and/or dominion over them, if any,
therefore, is attributed only against the appellant No.2. Other allegations
made against the appellants are general in nature.
Entrustment is said to have been made to the appellants and/or their
son.
No definite case of entrustment of any property has been made against
the appellant No.1.
He is only said to have given back to the complainant’s parent the
entire cloth and jewelry. No demand was made by the respondent.
Offering of Rs.25 lakhs for grant of divorce by mutual consent as
compensation to the complainant, which is three times of the amount of the
value of ‘Streedhana’ and/or amount spent by the complainant’s father per se
does not constitute any offence of Section 406 of the Code.

38
Any gift made to the bridegroom or his parents – whether in
accordance with any custom or otherwise also would not constitute any
offence under Section 406 of the Code.
In State of Punjab vs. Pritam Chand & Ors. [2009 (2) SCALE 457], it
has been held:
“4. Section 406 IPC deals with punishment for
criminal breach of trust. In a case under Section
406 the prosecution is required to prove that the
accused was entrusted with property or he had
dominion over the property and that the accused
misappropriated or converted the property to his
own use or used or disposed of the property or
willfully suffered any person to dispose of the
property dishonestly or in violation of any
direction of law prescribing the mode in which the
entrusted property should be dealt with or any
legal contract express or implied which he had
entered into relating to carrying out of the trust.”
{See also Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia & Ors. vs. State of Punjab &
Ors.[2009 (7) SCALE 85]}
We, therefore, are of the opinion that prima facie a case under Section
406 of the IPC has been made out only against appellant No.2.
Before parting, we may observe that courts at all levels have made
endeavours to bring about a settlement between the parties. The High Court

39
in the earlier round of proceedings probably rightly observed that the
marriage between the Monica and Vikas has irretrievably been broken down.
The appeals are allowed to the extent mentioned hereinabove.
The summoning order dated 21.3.2005 passed against the appellants
except Appellant No.2 is set aside. It is clarified that the proceedings can
continue only against the appellant No.2, that too in respect of Section 406
IPC only.

………………………….J.
[S.B. Sinha]
..…………………………J.
[Cyriac Joseph]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 27, 2009

40